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THE DRIVE TO STOP THE DRINKER FROM DRIVING:
SUGGESTED CIVIL APPROACHES

LARRY KRAFT*

I. INTRODUCTION
It has been said that the public is crying out against drunk
drivers. 1 Whether the public is outraged, or rather the issue is being
forced upon the public, not since the Attica era has a single
criminal justice issue so dominated the news. Victims of vehicle
2
accidents and their families have launched vigorous campaigns
against the drinking driver.3 Their interest has encouraged
*Professor of Laws, University of North Dakota School of Law; .J.D., University of North
Dakota, 1964; LL.M., University of Texas, 1970.
1. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983) (United States Supreme Court
referred to the "recent outcry" against drunk drivers).
2. See Evans, One More for the Road, FLA. B. J., Oct. 1982, at 691. Evans stated, "Newspaper
editorials, television news coverage, and intensive lobbying by constituents and organizations such
as the Mothers Against Drunk Drivers all helped make DUI [Driving*Under the Influence] a major
issue in the overloaded 1982 session." Id.
3. The term "drinking driver" should be distinguished from the expression "drunk driver."
The latter phrase suggests the legal conclusion that the driver was legally intoxicated as defined by a
N.D. Sess.
statute. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1980) amended by S. 2373, 48th Leg., Laws - (effective July 1, 1983) (a person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor when his
blood alcohol content level is 0.10 %). In casting aside the criminal connotations associated with the
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Congress 4 and state legislatures5 to promulgate new and more
stringent drunk driver criminal laws. Statistics also should prompt
legislatures to act. 6 Drinking drivers are responsible for more than
one-half of all auto accidents. 7 Thus the magnitude of the problem 8
also contributes to the recent "get tough" attitude. 9
Society has sought to deter ° and punish1 1 drinking drivers.
12
Yet, when society attempts to deter drinking drivers, it falters.
For every 2,000 drinking drivers, law enforcement officials
probably will apprehend only one driver. 13 This minimal capacity
to enforce contributes to a person's decision to drive even though
he has been drinking. When society seeks to punish drinking

term "drunk driver," the author advocates ascribing civil connotations to the term "drinking
driver." The author suggests that the tort standard of"the reasonable person of ordinary prudence"
would define a person as a "drinking driver" when a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would
decide not to drive after consuming a sufficient amount of alcohol. For a general discussion of the
reasonable man standard, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
4. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 402 (Supp. V 1981). Section 402 provides that state highway safety
programs must comply with federal standards to qualify for incentive grants. Id. The legislative
history indicates that Congress considered drunk driving a "grave national problem" and saw a
need "to provide effective, comprehensive programs, as well as penalties and administrative
procedures to deter [drunk drivers." S. REP. No. 360, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982).
5. See Starr, The War Agai, 4 runk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 1982, at 34. Starr reported in
1982 that 27 state legislatures had passed "their own versions of the toughest drunk-driving bill in
the nation" and that legislation was pending in other states. Id. at 35.
6. See S. REP. No. 360, supra note 4, at 2. The report states as follows:
[O]f the 50,000 Americans who die in motor vehicle accidents every year, at least
26,000 are killed in drunk driving incidents, 125,000 are permanently disabled, and
650,000 people are injured so severely they must miss work for at least a few days.
Witnesses at the March 3d hearing estimated the economic cost of these accidents at
up to $17 billion dollars each year, yet only one out of 2,000 drunk drivers is arrested.
Id.
7. See Starr, supra note 5, at 37 ("[d]runk driving accounts for fully half of all auto fatalities and kills far more Americans each year than other accidents").
8. See Note, AkoholAbuse andthe Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1675 (1981) ("Arrests for drunken
drivers now exceed 1.2 million per year, more than any other type of arrest. ").
9. See 128 CONG. REc. S4814-15 (daily ed. May 11, 1982) (statement of Sen. Pell). Senator Pell
from Rhode Island stated, "There is no doubt that American people want stronger laws to punish
drunk drivers." Id.
10. See S. REP. No. 360, supra note 4, at 2. The report states that "the key elements contributing
to deterrence of the drunk driver are the amount of enforcement and the speed and certainty of
punishment." Id. The purpose of the proposed act is to provide states an incentive to implement
such enforcement procedures. Id. at 1. See generally H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIvER, 86-90

(1982). Ross believes that both novel drinking-and-driving laws and enforcement campaigns are
effective means of deterrence for only a short period. Id. at 90.
11. See generally H. Ross, supra note 10, at 91-97. Ross maintains that when society threatens a
severe punishment for the drinking driver, it is unlikely to enforce the punishment. Id. at 97.
12. See H. Ross, supra note 10, at 86-89. Ross evaluates the Alcohol Safety Action Projects
(ASAP's) conducted by the Department of Transporation in the 1970s. Id. Although the ASAP's did
effectively increase the actual probability of apprehending drivers, which in turn deterred people
from driving after drinking, the poor methodology of the ASAP's limited the statistical significance
of the projects. Id. Ross narrowed the findings of the ASAP's to a single conclusion: "[The ASAP's]
supplied evidence supporting the proposition that some programs involving enforcement of
prevailing U.S. laws could, in the short run, produce declines in drinking and driving and in
associated casualties." Id. at 89.
13. See Note, supra note 8, at 1677. Even if a police officer observes the drunken driver, the
probability of arrest is minimal - one arrest for every 200 observed drinking drivers. Id.
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drivers, it again fails. 14 Drinking drivers are rarely sent to jail. 15
One explanation offered for society's reluctance to punish is
that the public may view the drinking driver and think" [t]here but
for the grace of God go I. '"16 Another rationale for society's
reluctance is the tendency to consider the drinking driver as a
person suffering the disease of alcoholism. 17 Finally, the discretion
given society's agents - police officers, prosecutors, judges, and
18
juries - may undermine the enforcement of laws.
This lack of enforcement and punishment therefore signifies
tension: society may have a "get tough" attitude, yet its demeanor
changes when the drinking driver enters the criminal system. The
purpose of this Article is to search for solutions that will dispel this
tension. The search is for a civil procedure 19 that will promote
14. See Haddon & Blumenthal, Foreward to H. Ross, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER at xviii
(1982). The authors describe how a defendant can escape punishment as follows:
Even when apprehended, only a tiny percentage of ... [intoxicated] drivers ever
receive more than a slap on the wrist, even though severe legal sanctions are available
under the laws of all the states. The system is riddled with escape hatches of
bewildering ingeniousness, variety, and effectiveness. It is also replete with long delays
that not only leave the offending driver free for long periods to continue to operate his
vehicle but also separate so widely the disposition of his case from the date of his
offense and his concomitant intoxication that the likelihood of conviction is even
further reduced.
Id. The authors note that the drinking driver may continue to operate his vehicle because of long
delays in the legal process. Id.
15. See Haddon & Blumenthal, supra note 14, at xiii.
16. Haddon & Blumenthal, supra note 14, at xiii.
17. See generally Note, supra note 8, at 1662. Prior to the 1960s the predominant view was that
even severe alcohol abuse was both "willful and culpable, a sign of moral weakness at best, of
dissolute immorality at worst." Id. at 1661. Replacing this "sin model" was the "disease model."
Id. at 1662. People who viewed alcoholism as a disease sought to eliminate the stigma of alcoholism
and to Provide the ill with niedical treatment. Id.
18. See H. Ross, supra note 10, at 97. When the legal system threatens to impose a sanction,
discretion on the part of its officers can occur. Id. "For example, police may reduce arrests in a
particular category, prosecutors may fail to charge in the category, judges and juries may fail to
convict or find reason to mitigate the penalties, and those convicted may find ways to avoid the
prescribed sanctions." Id.
19. The rationale for characterizing one process as civil and another as criminal is unclear. One
writer attempted to explain the distinction as follows:
A crime must be defined by reference to the legal consequences of the act. We must
distinguish, primarily, not between crimes and civil wrongs, but between criminal and
civil proceedings. A crime then becomes an act that is capable of being followed by
criminal proceedings, having one of the types of outcome (punishment, etc.) known to
lltow these proceedings ....
* * * According to the established dichotomy, all jurisdiction of the ordinary courts
is either criminal or civil. If it is not criminal, it must be civil. There are no common
features of civil proceedings ....
J. GOLDSTEIN, A. DERsHOWITZ & R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 314 (1974) (emphasis in original)
(quoting 8 W. GLANVtLLE, CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 123-24 (1955)); see also McCoid, Intoxicationand
Its Effect upon Civil Responsibility, 42 IowA L. REV. 38, 38 (1956). McCoid noted that in the 1950s few
people discussed a person's civil liability for his own intoxication. Id. In the 1980s the law's
preoccupation with criminal liability is lessening as courts tend to award punitive damages in civil
actions. See Note, The Drunken Driver and Punitive Damages:A Survey of the Feasibilityof a Punitive Damage
Award in North Dakota, 59 N.D.L.-REV. 413, 414 (1983) (an increasing number ofjurisdictions are
awarding punitive damages).
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effectively society's safety and that will treat fairly the drinking
driver. This Article briefly proposes three civil procedures. When
the owner of a vehicle or one to whom he entrusts his vehicle drives
after drinking when a reasonable person of ordinary prudence
would not,2 0 the owner may be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture of his vehicle,2 1 to an assessment of a civil penalty, 2 2 or to
the loss of a bond that he previously posted. 23 These three civil
processes seem viable after analyzing four aspects of the drinking
driver problem: the class of persons who are drinking drivers, the
relationship of alcoholism to the law's treatment of disease, the tort
duty to control access to a vehicle, and the vehicle as an instrument
of crime. The discussion of these four aspects provides the legal
foundation for adopting a civil approach to the drinking driver
problem.
II. DEFINING THE CLASS OF DRINKING DRIVERS
An effective solution to the drinking driver problem should
logically focus on precluding from driving those individuals who
are most likely to drive after drinking. The National Safety
Council's repc, in 1981 indicated that in the fifteen to twenty-four
year age grouF 17,700 persons were killed in alcohol related
accidents and thac in the larger twenty-five to forty-four year age
group, 16,100 persons were killed. 24 Another study, however,
concludes that "[t]he majority of those arrested for driving while
intoxicated are problem drinkers.' 25 Although an exact
characterization of the drinking driver is difficult, the cited statistics
and studies suggest two prominent classifications chronic
alcoholics and young drivers.
A.

CHRONIC ALCOHOLICS

The legal system's response to inebriation has changed since
Blackstone's Commentaries.26 At common law, drunkenness was
20. For a discussion of this standard, see supra note 3.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 74-128.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 129-41.
23. See infra text accompanying note 142.
24. See Carraro, 1981 Motor Vehicle Deaths on a ... Downgrade, TRAFFIC SAFETY, May-June 1982,
at 21, 24. Carraro reports that "[s]ince 1961, death [due to auto accidents] in the 15-to-24-year age
group have increased 95 per cent, by far the largest percentage change recorded in any age group."
Id. In 1981 this age group comprised more than one-third of all motor vehicle accident victims. Id.
25. See Note, supra note 8, at 1678.
26. See J. VORENBERO, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 172-73 (2d ed.
1981) (most American courts do not follow the English common law view of intoxication as reported
by Blackstone).
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"artificial, voluntarily contracted madness," which increased the
seriousness of the offense. 27 This concern for sobriety nevertheless
still exists today when a state enacts legislation declaring that
voluntarily induced intoxication is not an excuse for committing a
crime. 2 8 Yet, a majority of states do not follow the harsh common
29
law view of finding intoxication an aggravating circumstance.
Proof of intoxication, however, is necessary for two crimes, public
intoxication" and driving while intoxicated.31
Public intoxication was the offense analyzed by the United
States Supreme Court in the decision of Powell v. Texas. 32 In Powell
the Court upheld a conviction for public drunkenness, 33 stating
that it was not cruel and unusual punishment 34 to punish alcoholics
35
who appeared in public.
Because fourJustices dissented in Powell,36 one state court two
years after Powell found that the Court's divisiveness supported its
decision to reverse a conviction for public intoxication.3 7 In State v.
27. Id. at 172 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *26). Vorenberg quotes from
Blackstone's Commentariesfor the following strict common law view of intoxication:
[A]s to artificial, voluntarily contracted madness, by drunkenness or intoxication,
which, depriving men of their reason, puts them in a temporary frenzy; our law looks
upon this as an aggravation of the offence, rather than as an excuse for any criminal
misbehaviour. A drunkard, says Sir Edward Coke, who is voluntarius daemon hath no
privilege thereby, but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate
it ....
Id. at 172-73 (quoting 4 W. BIACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *26).
28. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-02(1) (Supp. 1981). Section 12.1-04-02(1) provides as
follows:
Intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge. Intoxication does not, in itself,
constitute mental disease or defect within the meaning of section 12.1-04-03 [person is
not responsible for his criminal conduct if he lacks the capacity to comprehend the
nature or the consequences of his act]. Evidence of intoxication is admissible whenever
it is relevant to negate or to establish an element of the offense charged.
Id.
29. SeeJ. VORENBERO, supra note 26 at 173.
30. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 340.96 (repealed 1971). Section 340.96 provided that "[e]very
person who becomes intoxicated by voluntarily drinking intoxicating liquors is guilty of the crime of
drunkenness." Id. In State v. Fearon, 283 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969), the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted this statute and concluded that a chronic alcoholic could not
"voluntarily" become intoxicated. Id. at 96-97, 166 N.W.2d at 724. Two years after Fearon, the
Minnesota Legislature repealed § 340.96 and adopted § 340.961. Act of March 29, 1971. ch. 90, §
1,2. 1971 Minn. Laws 178. See MINN. STAT. § 340.961 (1982).
31. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §39-20-07 (1979).
32. 392 U.S. 514 (1967).
33. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 537 (1967). Section 477 of the Texas Penal Code provided as
follows: "Whoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any
private house except his own, shall be lined not exceeding one hundred dollars.- TEX. PExAL CODE §
477 (Vernon 1952).
34. 392 U.S. at 532-37. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("[c]ruel and unusual punishment [shall
not bel inflicted").
35. 392 U.S. at 533-37.
36. Id. at 554-70 (Fortas. J.. dissenting). Justice Fortas was joined in his dissent by Justices
Douglas. Brennan. and Stewart. Id. at 554.
37. State v. Fearon. 283 Minn. 90. 97. 166 N.W.2d 720. 726 (1969).
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Fearon38 the Minnesota Supreme Court limited the application of a
public intoxication criminal law to persons who consumed alcohol
by choice. 3 9 The court reasoned that because alcoholics had lost
their freedom to choose, the law was not intended to apply to
them. 40 The court also noted that unlike the record in Powell,4 1 the
expert who testified in Fearon distinguished the defendant's loss of
control over when he would drink and the loss of control over how
much he would drink. 42 Two years after Fearon,4 3the Minnesota
Legislature repealed the public intoxication statute.
Instead of searching for a distinction to bar the application of
Powell, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recently took
a more direct approach. 44 In State ex rel. Harper v. Zegeer4 5 the West
Virginia court did what the United States Supreme Court refused
to do and found that punishing chronic alcoholics 46 for being
publicly intoxicated violated the state's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 47 Yet, the Zegeer court did not declare the
public intoxication law48 unconstitutional as applied to persons who
voluntarily become intoxicated. 49 Rather, the court outlined a
38. 283 Minn. 90, 166 N.W.2d 720 (1969).
39. Id. at 94, 166 N.W.2d at 723-24.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 97 n.4, 166 N.W.2d at 724 n.4. In Powell the Court tersely concluded, "We know very
little about the circumstances surrounding the drinking bout which'resulted in this conviction, or
about Leroy Powell's drinking problem, or indeed about alcoholism itself." 392 U.S. at 521-22.
42. 283 Minn. at 97 n.4, 166 N.W.2d at 724 n.4.
43. Act of March 29, 1971, ch. 90, §§ 1,2, 1971 Minn. Laws 178. See MINN. STAT. § 340.961
(1982) (drunkenness is not a crime).
44. See State ex rel.
Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873, 877 (W. Va. 1982). The West Virginia
Supreme Court ofAppeals agreed with the Fearon court's refusal to punish alcoholics for intoxication.
Id. at 877. It noted that Fearon was the only post-Powell case that protected alcoholics from being
convicted for public intoxication. Id. Thirteen years after Fearon and after many courts had upheld
the convictions of alcoholics for public intoxication, the West Virginia court dismissed the concerns
of other courts. See id. at 877-78.
45. 296 S.E.2d 873 (W. Va. 1982).
46. The Zegeer court emphasized that the phrase "chronic alcoholic" is redundant. State ex re.
Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873, 874 n.1 (W. Va. 1982). The court explained that chronicity is
implicit in most definitions of alcoholism. Id. It clarified that it would use the phrase "chronic
alcoholics" to indicate that it was "writing about people who are ill, and not about drinking
revelers." Id.
the court's concern for understanding the problem of alcoholism is demonstrated by its
thorough research on alcoholism and its decision to provide lawyers and other judges with three
recognized definitions of alcoholism. Id. at 874-75. The court quoted the following definition from
the American Medical Association:
Alcoholism is an illness characterized by preoccupation with alcohol and loss of
control over its consumption such as to lead usually to intoxication if drinking is
begun; by chronicity; by progression; and by tendency toward relapse. It is typically
associated with physical disability and impaired emotional occupation, and/or social
adjustments as a direct consequence of persistent and excessive use of alcohol.
Id. at 875 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 875. See W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
48, Id. W. VA. CODE § 60-6-9(1) (1977). Section 60-6-9(1) of the West Virginia Code provides
that "[a] person shall not... [aippear in a public place in an intoxicated condition." Id.
49. 296 S.E.2d at 878-79 n.10.
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procedure that allows the actor, or the arresting officer on his
behalf, to in effect raise the defense of alcoholism, which in turn
50
triggers a civil commitment proceeding.
The Zegeer court therefore distinguished between chronic
alcoholics and persons who voluntarily become intoxicated.51 The
court promulgated a defense to public intoxication based on its
research of the literature of alcoholism and of case law.5 2 It found

unpersuasive the following arguments: That drinking is a voluntary act for the alcoholic; 53 that if alcoholism is a defense to public
intoxication, it might become a defense to other crimes;5 4 that
incarceration is beneficial to alcoholics; 55 and that the status of an
alcoholic is not punishable, but the act of being intoxicated in a
public place is punishable.5 6 The court emphasized that most states
have adopted the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment
Act, which treats alcoholism as a disease.5 7 Other states, the court
noted, have developed diversionary systems for problem drinkers.5 8
Even though the Zegeer court recognized that alcoholism is a
disease5 9 and that this disease justifies granting chronic alcoholics a
defense to public intoxication, 60 it nonetheless limited the scope of
its holding. 6 1 The court in a footnote clarified that this defense was
inapplicable to chronic alcoholics who, while intoxicated, breach
the peace, commit assaults, or drive. 62 The court stated, "This
opinion is about people who are charged solely with public
63
intoxication."'

The court's limited holding is anomalous. Either it is cruel and
unusual to punish chronic alcoholics for the act of being intoxicated
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 882-87.
Id. at 886.
Id. at 874-78, 886.
Id. at 878 (citing Budd v. Madigan, 418 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397

U.S. 1053 (1970)).
54. 296 S.E.2d at 877 (citing State v. Brant, 252 S.E.2d 901, 903 (W. Va. 1979)).
55. 296 S.E.2d at 877 (citing Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wash. 2d 786, 790-91, 435 P.2d 692, 702
(1967)).
56. 296 S.E.2d at 878 (citing Budd v. Madigan, 418 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1053 (1970)).
57. 296 S.E.2d at 878. See UNIF. ALCOHOLISM & INTOXICATION TREATMENT ACT 5 1, 9 U.L.A. 62
(1971) ("alcoholics... should be afforded a continuum of treatment"). The court indicated that the
following states have adopted the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act: Alaska,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North

Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin. 296 S.E.2d at 878 n.6.
58. 296 S.E.2d at 878 nn.7-8. Some of the states that have adopted a diversionary system
include: Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Id.
59. 296 S.E.2d at 878.
60. Id. at 886.
61. Id. at 878.
62. Id. at 878 n.10.
63. Id.
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or it is not. If it is not cruel and unusual to punish chronic
alcoholics who drink and drive, then the "intoxicated" act is being
punished. Yet, the physical act of driving is wrong because of the
actor's intoxicated state.
The argument that alcoholism is a disease should apply with
equal force to the chronic alcoholic who drives while intoxicated. It
is not expected, however, that legislatures or courts will be
persuaded to decriminalize drunken driving, 64 nor is it suggested
by this Article that such an effort should be made. Rather, the
purpose of examining the law's struggle with the public
intoxication crime is to illustrate two conclusions: there is general
agreement that chronic alcoholism is a disease, 65 and the criminal
law alone cannot rid the streets of persons infected with the disease
66
of alcoholism.
These conclusions suggest that those searching for solutions to
the drinking driver problem should recognize that there is an
increasing tendency to avoid holding those suffering the disease of
alcoholism criminally culpable. 67 Further, lawmakers should
acknowledge that the criminal law has been largely ineffective in
deterring the antisocial conduct of the chronic alcoholic. 68 It must
also be recognized, however, that the solution cannot be to
decriminalize and ignore the conduct of the chronic alcoholic who
drives while intoxicated; unlike those who are publicly intoxicated,
drunk drivers inflict pain, injury, and death upon innocent
bystanders. 69 Some type of control is obviously necessary. An ideal
solution, then, would appear to be one that would not compound
the criminal culpability of an alcoholic who drives while
intoxicated, but would protect the innocent from suffering because
of a drinking driver's disease.
B. YOUNG DRIVERS
Control can also be a key factor in reducing the number of
64. See id. at 878. The Zegeer court stated that "the State has a legitimate right to get them
Jalcoholics] off the streets or out of whatever public area in which they may be gamboling." Id.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
66. See Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d at 886-87 (civil commitment proceedings are necessary when chronic
alcoholics are charged with public intoxication).
67. See generally Note, Alcohol Abuse and the Law, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1660 (1981). The disease
model of alcoholism replaced the previous belief that alcoholics were sinful persons needing
punishment. Id. at 1661-62.
68. See id. at 1665 ("criminal treatment of public intoxication serves the best interests of neither
society nor the inebriates themselves").
69. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 920 (1983). In Neville the United States
Supreme Court stated that the problem of drinking and driving "occurs with tragic frequency on our
Nation's highways. The carnage caused by drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed
recitation here." Id.
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accidents in which young drivers are injured or killed. Drivers
between the ages of sixteen and twenty-five are responsible for, and
are injured or die in, a disproportionate number of alcohol related
accidents. 70 The simplistic solution of raising the drinking age to
the arbitrary common law "adult" age of twenty-one 71 does have a
positive effect because it decreases the number of intoxicated young
drivers. But this solution also punishes responsible youths, youths
whose activities are essentially adult activities. Solutions that
curtail the freedom of the irresponsible, regardless of their age,
have more to offer.
Young drivers have more in common than just chronological
age. Most of these drivers have their access to a vehicle controlled
by one or more individuals or institutions. Parents and guardians
make up the highest percentage of those third parties, especially
with respect to drivers under the age twenty-one.
Financial
institutions that supply money to purchase vehicles are also
interested parties that could assert control. Control from parents,
guardians, and lenders may be the only real deterrent to those
under the age of eighteen who, as juveniles, have little to fear from
increased criminal penalties. It is submitted that failure to control
responsibly the access to vehicles of immature young drivers is a
primary cause of the great majority of the alcohol related accidents
involving persons under twenty-five. Thus, remedial actions that
encourage responsible control would dramatically reduce the
number of alcohol related accidents.
C.

OTHER DRIVERS

Young drivers72 and alcoholics7" comprise a large portion of

70. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 1979 27 (Jan. 1981). In

1979 more than one-third of the drivers involved in fatal accidents were under the age of 25. Id.
Young drivers also tend to drive during the periods when most accidents occur, from 8:00 p.m. to
4:00 a.m. and on Friday and Saturday. Id.
The exact number of young drivers killed due to drinking while driving is not available. Id. For
example, even though almost half of the states in 1979 required the state to test the blood alcohol
content of fatally injured drivers, only 57% of those drivers were tested. Id. Of the tested drivers

whose blood alcohol equalled or exceeded 0.10%, more than 60% were involved in single vehicle
fatal accidents. Id.
71. See Starr, supra note 5, at 35. In September 1982 Starr reported that 20 states had raised the
legal drinking age, "reversing a Vietnam-era trend toward lower drinking ages that made alcoholrelated crashes by far the single biggest killer of Americans between the ages of 16 and 24." Id. He
also reported that NewJersey state Senator C. Louis Bassano, a sponsor of a bill to raise the drinking
age to 21, said that statistics indicate that young drivers cannot control their consumption and that
NewJersey's earlier decision to lower the drinking age was an experiment that failed. Id.
72. See supra note 70 (involvement ofyoung drivers in accidents).
73. See supra notes 26-69 and accompanying text (alcoholism as a disease).
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the class of drinking drivers. Yet, an ideal solution would reach all
drinking drivers. A logical approach to reaching all drinking
drivers is to concentrate on the element of control. Society can
control through civil proceedings the alcoholic's inability to control
his consumption and his access to vehicles, and parent-guardians
can control young drivers' access to vehicles. Similarly, other.
drivers can control their own actions by deciding not to drive when"
a prudent person of ordinary intelligence would not.
Solutions to the drinking driver problem will therefore need to
concentrate on how the law can permissibly control drivers. The
following section proposes three civil remedies that include the
element of control. All three civil remedies - confiscation and
forfeiture, the assessment of a penalty, and the posting of a bond seek to remove the stigma of the criminal process and to promote
the welfare of society and drinking drivers by reducing the injuries
and deaths caused by drinking drivers.
III. PROPOSED CIVIL REMEDIES TO THE DRINKING
DRIVER PROBLEM
Three civil remedies may compel individuals not to drive after
drinking a sufficient amount of alcohol: confiscation and
forefeiture, the assessment of a penalty, and the posting of a bond.
The following discussion of each remedy provides only a glance at
the process that such a remedy would involve if adopted. The
purpose of the analysis is to persuade legislatures to consider a civil
approach to the intractable problem of the drinking driver.
A.

CIVIL

FORFEITURE

PROCEEDINGS

TO

CONFISCATE

A

VEHICLE DRIVEN BY A DRINKING DRIVER

"Tougher" laws are less than an ideal solution to the
drinking driver problem in this country. 4 In the past, when
characteristics of a social problem made a criminal law solution
undesirable, the civil system provided a remedy. 75 For example,
when certain contagious diseases threatened the well-being of
society, the civil process was used to isolate contagious individuals,
even though they were not criminally culpable. 76 The drinking
74. For a discussion of society's failure to deter and punish drinking drivers, see supra notes 10-18
and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648, 648-49 (Fla. 1952) (civil process is necessary to
confine a person who has a contagious disease).
76. Id.
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driver is like an epidemic that spreads death and destruction. Yet,
some drivers suffer from the disease of alcoholism 77 and should not
be labeled criminals for committing disease related acts. 78 In a civil
forfeiture procedure the drinking driver would forfeit his vehicle,
the means by which he "contaminates" others. The following
section examines legal precedents that appear to support the use of
a civil forfeiture proceeding to confiscate a vehicle driven by a
drinking driver.
1. The DiseaseAnalogy
Disease infected people whose disease presents a threat to
others are not a new community concern. 79 The laws and mores of
every society in the world have dealt with this problem. 80 The
Anglo-American approach to treating disease infected people has
not been one of punishment, although the criminal law may play an
ancillary role in carrying out the primary goal of disease control. 8 1
Health officials have instead primarily relied upon isolating an
infected person or sterilizing or destroying the property with which
he has come into contact.8 2 When an infected person is unwilling to
or incapable of carrying out his own isolation or the sterilization or
destruction of his property, the community does it for him. 83
Generally, the community exercises its police power using a civil
process.84 In Moore v. Draper8 5 the Florida Supreme Court explained
the need for a civil process that can confine a contagious person
against his will.8 6 The court justified the state's police power with
the following rationale:

77. See supra notes 26-69 and accompanying test (alcoholism as a disease).
78. See, e.g., State ex rel.Harper v. Zegeer, 296 S.E.2d 873, 886 (W. Va. 1982) (chronic
alcoholism is a defense to the charge of public intoxication). But see Note, supra note 8, at 1661. The
author states that "it is often thought to be unfair to punish a person for involuntary acts, although
our society permits numerous other hardships to befall those suffering from involuntary conditions."

Id.
79. G. ANDERSON, M. ARNSTEIN & M. LESTER, COMMUNICABLE DiSEASE CONTROL 3-8 (4th ed.
1962).
80. W. SPINK, INFECTIOUS DIsEAsEs: PREVENTION AND TREATMENT IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 28-58 (1978).

81. In North Dakota one of the functions of a county health board is the preservation of the
public health. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-05-06 (Supp. 1982). Preservation of the public health requires
that all sources of filth and sickness may be ordered destroyed or removed upon an order and warrant
from the board. Id. A refusal to comply with such an order is a class B misdemeanor. N.D. CENT.
CODE 5 23-05-12 (1978).
82. See W. SPINK, supra note 80, at 28-58.
83. See generally Fleisher, The Law of Basic Public Health Activities: Police Power and Constitutional
Limitations,in LEGAL AsPEcTs OF HEALTH POLICY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 3-31 (1980).
84. See generally id. at 10-16.
85. 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
86. Moore v.Draper, 57 So. 2d 648, 648-49 (Fla. 1952).
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Recent history of public health matters shows that
tuberculosis was recognized as one of the most dreadful
diseases and one of the greatest killers . . . . It was
recognized that those afflicted with this disease were a
menace to society. They walked the streets; went to public
places ... ; they rode in common carriers; . . .they came
in close contact with relatives and friends and the general
public. They not only suffered themselves, but left
disease, misery, sorrow and death in their wake.
Vital statistics showed that tuberculosis was taking
an awful toll. The death rate was startling....
When the Petitioner feels that he has been cured or
that his disease has been so arrested that he is not and will
not be dangerous to others, the Courts of the State will be
open to him and he should be afforded ample opportunity
to obtain his release ....87
This forced isolation or forced destruction of property
88
obviously cannot be accomplished without affording due process
to the diseased individual or the owner of the infected property.8 9
The process due, however, can be a civil process, and that civil
process becomes viable when a tireat to the community presents
itself.90 At such times the good of the community demands a
reasonable compromise of individual liberty or property rights. 9 1
By analogy, if an alcoholic has a disease, an automobile under the
control of an alcoholic is a contagion and what the alcoholic spreads
is a plague.
87. Id. at 648-50.
88. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law").
89. See Draper,57 So. 2d at 649.

90. Id.
91. In Anglo-American law legal principles exist that are difficult to categorize as belonging in
either the criminal justice system or the civil justice system. Rather, they might best be described as a
system of laws higher than both; a system that is more in the nature of a moratorium against the
enforcement of all other laws. While rarely seen, it is the system that controls conduct when a
community is faced with a state of emergency. Epidemics, earthquakes, floods, tornados, hurricanes,
and conflagrations give it life, and when it is called upon, private property rights and the right to
personal liberty become subordinate to the community's interest in controlling the community

threat. A threat to the general welfare of society that is serious warrants imposing the laws of
necessity. See e.g., Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 70, 74 (1853). The Surocco court stated as follows:
The right to destroy property, to prevent the spread of a conflagration, has been
traced to the highest law of necessity, and the natural rights of man, independent of
society or civil government. "It is referred by moralists and jurists to the same great
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If a state's police power is broad enough to use the civil process
to prevent its tuberculosis infected citizens from spreading
tuberculosis, this police power should also control alcoholics who
drive. A civil process that requires the alcoholic, who has been
caught driving while intoxicated, to forfeit his vehicle does not
condemn the alcoholic as a criminal, but rather it prevents him
from injuring himself and others.
2. The Tort Duty to ControlAccess to a Vehicle
A vehicle owner's duty to control access to his vehicle by other
drivers is recognized by tort law. 92 An example of a legal principle
that recognizes this duty is the tort of negligent entrustment.9 3 A
reasonable and prudent owner simply would not entrust his vehicle
94
to one he has reason to believe will drive after drinking.
Therefore, when he does entrust his vehicle to a drinking driver,
95
the owner breaches a duty.
This duty to control is also the basis of a number of vicarious
liability concepts. 9 6 The effect of imposing vicarious liability is to
impute to the owner liability for the acts of a person to whom the
owner has provided a vehicle. 97 The employer-employee
relationship, for example, imputes vicarious liability. 98 Because of
this imputation employers have been held responsible for the
damages caused by employees who drove after drinking. 99
Similarly, both "consent statutes" 10 0 and the "family purpose

principle which justifies the exclusive appropriation of a plank in a shipwreck, though
the lfit of another be sacrified; with the throwing overboard goods in a tempest, for the
safety of a vessel: with the trespassing upon the lands of another, to escape death by an
enemy. It rests upon the maxim, Necessitasinducitprivilegiumquodjuraprivata."
... At such times, the individual rights of property give way to the higher laws of
impending necessity.
Id. Similarly, the only prerequisite to declaring that the drinking driver should forfeit his vehicle is
recognition that the problem ofdrinking and driving is as serious as other exigencies governed by the
laws of necessity.
92. See W. PROSSER, supra note 3 § 73. Dean Prosser explains that the increase in traffic accidents
coupled with the insolvency of drivers led to the imposition of liability upon the owners of vehicles,
even those free from negligence. Id.
93. SeeJohnson v. Caseha, 197 Cal. App. 2d 272,
-_, 17 Cal. Rptr. 81, 82-83 (Ct. App. 1961)
(owner was liable for entrusting vehicle to a known incompetent driver).
94. Id. at
, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
95. Id.
96. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, 5§ 69-74 (discussion of imputed negligence in the
relationships of master and servant, employer and independent contractor, and vehicle owner and
passenger).
97. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, 9 69.
98. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 70.
99. W. PROSSER, supra note 3, 9 70.
100. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 170.54 (1982). Section 170.54 states that "[w]henever any motor
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doctrine" 10 ' directly hold the owner responsible for the actions of
02
other individuals. 1
One can only speculate about the reasons the prospect of a
large judgment does not deter all owners from letting inebriates
drive their cars. The fact that the odds are overwhelmingly against
the vehicle being in an accident might be a reason. 10 3 Then, too, if
the vehicle is involved in such an accident, there is likely to be
insurance.10 4 Those drivers who do not have insurance are
probably also judgment proof, a fact that allows them to operate
outside the reaches of tort law.
Even if the discussed common tort remedies encourage an
owner to exercise more care when he lets others use his vehicle, the
tort remedies have one major limitation - they do not operate
until after a drinking driver is in an accident. These tort remedies
are ineffective because, while the owner is said to have breached a
duty to the traveling public by turning over control of his vehicle to
a drinking driver, liability depends upon a breach of duty'0 5 that
actually causes damage to another individual. 10 6 A remedy that
would hold the owner responsible for creating a serious threat of
injury or damage to the public would thus seem prudent because it
07
would more effectively promote safety.'
B.

THE VEHICLE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CRIME

Instead of concentrating solely on the owner's responsibility to
control access to a vehicle, the community could consider the
vehicle itself to be an instrumentality of crime. 10 8 A vehicle is
vehicle shall be operated within this state, by any person other than the owner, with the consent of
the owner, express or implied, the operator thereof shall in case of accident, be deemed the agent of
the owner of such motor vehicle in the operation thereof." Id.
101. See generally W. PiROSSER, supra note 3 S 73. The family purpose doctrine is a legal fiction

created by the courts. Id. According to the doctrine, the owner of an automobile is held vicariously
liable when the car is negligently driven by a member of the immediate household. Id. It is assumed
that the driver is pursuing a "family purpose." Id. The owner must have given permission to the
driver, but this may be implied from general circumstances. Id.
102. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 73. Indirect support for the owner's vicarious
liability is the legal concept ofjoint enterprise, which considers the presence of a common purpose
sufficient to impose liability upon the owner of a vehicle for the negligent acts ofhis associate. See id. S
72.
103. See Note, supra note 8, at 1677. Even if a police officer observes an intoxicated driver, the
probability of arrest is minimal - one arrest for every 200 observed drinking drivers. Id.
104. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, §73 (likelihood that owner of a vehicle is insured was
one reason for the extension of vicarious liability to vehicle owners).
105. See generally W. PROSsER, supra note 3, § 53 (discusses complex problems inherent in the
concept of duty).
106. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 30 (actual loss or damage to another is an element
of a tort).

107. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 3, § 30 (even if actual loss to the plaintiff does not occur,
a court of equity may grant an injunction when there is a threat of irreparable injury).
108. The community's interest in removing that which facilitates the commission of crime is
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property, and Anglo-American law has long had an arsenal of
crime prevention processes aimed at property that is used by
criminals. 109 Generally these processes recognize that property used
or intended for use in the commission of crime is contraband" 0 and
that contraband is subject to confiscation by and forfeiture to the
government."' The forfeiture process is generally a civil
procedure. 1 2 As a civil procedure, forfeiture can impede the
success of criminal ventures by eliminating instrumentalities used
by the potential criminals. 113
Legislative provisions authorizing the confiscation and
forfeiture of vehicles are common, 114 as is the taking of vehicles
pursuant to authority given in that legislation. 115 Such provisions
are found in the federal custom laws, 116 federal drug laws, 117 and
federal revenue laws. 118 States have similar laws for illegal drugs,"t 9
and some states use these procedures to help prevent violations of
0
their hunting and fishing laws.12
analogous to the community's interest in removing contagions. See supra text accompanying notes 7991.
109. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. S 1595a (1976). Section 1595a states in part:
[E]very vessel, vehicle, animal, aircraft, or other thing used in, to aid in, or to
facilitate, by obtaining information or in any other way, the importation, bringing in,
unlading, landing, removal, concealing, harboring, or subsequent transportation of
any article which is being or has been introduced, or attempted to be introduced, into
the United States contrary to law, whether upon such vessel, vehicle, animal, aircraft,
or other thing otherwise, shall be seized and forfeited together with its tackle, apparel,
furniture, harness, or equipment.
Id.
110. See State v. Three ISO-2 Devices, 296 N.W.2d 510, 513 (S.D. 1980) (distinguishes between
"contraband per se" and "derivative contraband"). More important than the question of which
species of contraband is involved is the language used in statutes. See, e. g., United States v. 1964
Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1982) (important difference between property
that has "a substantial connection with" the underlying crime and property that is used "in any
manner" to facilitate the crime).
11l. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. 9 1595a (1976) (contraband is subject to confiscation). For the text of
§ 1595a, see supra note 109.
112. SeeUnited States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 1982).
113. See id. at 13.
114. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976). Section 782 provides that any vehicle, vessel, or aircraft
used to transport contraband shall be seized and forfeited. Id. Contraband is defined to include
illegal firearms, drugs, and counterfeit money or securities. Id. § 781.
115. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 156 (3d Cir.
1981) (seized automobile because there was probable cause to believe that it was used in narcotics
traffic).
116. See 19 U.S.C. § 1595a (1976). For the text of§ 1595a, see supra note 109.
117. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976). Section 881 states in part that "[t]he following shall be subject
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: . . . vehicles, . . . which
are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation...
[of illegal drugs]." Id.
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 3615 (1976). Section 3615 states in part that "[a]ll liquor involved in any
violation of sections 1261-1265 of this title, the containers of such liquor, and every vehicle or vessel
used in the transportation thereof, shall be seized and forfeited." Id.
119. See, e.g., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4476-15, § 5.03(a) (5) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983)
(property subject to forfeiture under Controlled Substances Act).
120. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 20.1-10-01 (1978) (property subject to confiscation by game
and fish officials).
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Because the process is aimed at property, 12 1 not people, 122 it
can be a civil process. 123 As a civil process, it is not encumbered by
the many criminal law procedural devices designed to guarantee
that no innocent person is punished.1 24 The taking is, however,
subject to due process.1 25 Nevertheless, because confiscation and
forfeiture are civil processes, there is a great deal of flexibility,
especially in such matters as burden of proof126 and probable
cause. 127
121. Forfeiture proceedings are generally considered in rem proceedings against the vehicle. See
United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1979). This (-aln lead to
"seemingly inequitable circumstances." Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir.
1974). The Bramble court stated:
Thus... an automobile was forfeited because it was being used to defraud the United
States of the tax on distilled spirits .... The owner of the car, innocent of any criminal
wrongdoing himself, was nevertheless deprived of his property because " . . . the
vehicle is the offender and must be forfeited if there is a guilty intent on the part of him
who used it .... "
Id. (citing United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321, 332 (1926)). Similarly,
when a father allowed his son to use the father's car, apparently with little restriction, and the son
used the car to transport marijuana, the father lost his car. United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera
Automobile, 560 F.2d 897, 901 (8th Cir. 1977).
122. Forfeiture is appropriate even if the person charged with the underlying crime in which the
property was used was found not guilty. State v. Rose, 173 N.J. Super. 478,
-, 414 A.2d 600, 602
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980). Moreover, forfeiture does not constitute criminal punishment for
doublejeopardy purposes. United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1972).
123. See Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 971 (10th Cir. 1974).
124. See United States v. One 1973 Pontiac Grand Am, 413 F. Supp. 163, 164-65 (W.D. Tex.
1976). But see D. NICHOLS, J. KASTNER & P. CARRUTHERS, THE DRINKING DRIVER IN MINNESOTA 13
(Supp. 1982) ("person's driving privilege is a property right protected under due process clause").
125. United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in United States
Currency, 645 F.2d 836 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted,455 U.S. 1015 (1982). In UnitedStates v. Eight
ThousandEight Hundred Fifty Dollars($8,850) in UnitedStates Currency the Ninth Circuit stated:
Our Constitution provides that property shall not be taken without due process of
law. The right to some kind of prompt judicial determination upon deprivation of
property is well established....
The constitutional basis for the law on due process claims in customs seizure cases
may be stated in brief as follows:
1. Due process requires that procedural safeguards accompany government
seizure of private property....
2. In most cases, due process requires pre-seizure safeguards....
3. The exigencies involved in customs seizure cases allow a limited exception to
the requirement ofa pre-seizure hearing....
4. The requirements of due process are met in cust6ms seizure cases where the
requisite proceedings are initiated promptly....
5. Any delay in instituting forfeiture proceedings must bejustified.
645 F.2d at 839 (citations omitted).
The public interest in enforcement of drug laws allows the seizure of private property without
preseizure notice and an opportunity to be heard. See United States v. One 1981 BMW 4-Door
Sedan, 652 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1981).
126. When there is probable cause to institute a forfeiture proceeding, the burden of proof can
lie with a claimant who is challenging the forfeiture. See United States v. $2,500 in United States
Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 970 (10th
Cir. 1974) (government must establish probable cause for the institution ofthe forfeiture action).
127. "The probable cause standard to be used in actions brought under § 881 (a) (4) is whether
there is 'a reasonable ground for belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more
than mere suspicion.' " United States v. 1964 Beechcraft Baron Aircraft, 691 F.2d 725, 727 (5th
Cir. 1982) (quoting United States v. One 1979 Mercury Cougar XR-7, 666 F.2d 228, 230 n.3 (5th
Cir. 1982)). Evidence that a vehicle was used to facilitate the sale or transportation of contraband
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The crime and health problems caused by the misuse of
vehicles by drinking drivers would likely justify the promulgation
of confiscation and forfeiture procedures aimed at the public's
taking of any motor vehicle that was used, or was intended for
use, 128 by a drinking driver. The arguments that justify the taking
of vehicles to impede the commission of other drug related offenses
apply with special force to the offense of driving while intoxicated.
Vehicle owners who refrain from driving after drinking will
not risk the loss of their vehicles, and those who will not refrain
present too great a danger to be extended the privileges of ownership of vehicles. The loss of those privileges would drastically
reduce the number of repeat offenders. Vehicle owners who allow
others to use-their vehicles will be less inclined to hand the keys to a
person who may cause the owner to lose his vehicle in a forfeiture
proceeding.
If the public is serious about addressing the problem of the
drinking driver the public will support the enactment of civil
confiscation and forfeiture proceedings. A truly outraged public
would not hesitate to do so. This approach would likely produce an
immediate and dramatic decrease in the incidence of drinking and
driving.
C.

OTHER CIVIL PROCESSES: THE IMPOSITION
PENALTY AND THE REQUIREMENT OF A BOND

OF A CIVIL

Other civil remedies are available to resolve the problem of the
drinking driver. States could hold the drinking driver or the owner
who entrusts his vehicle to a drinking driver liable and impose a
civil penalty. 129 Instead of imposing liability on an owner who
entrusts his vehicle to a drinking driver, states, as a condition to
granting a license, could require every driver to post a bond, which
would be forfeited when the licensed driver is apprehended for
drinking and driving. Both approaches seem to afford the states
with a simple civil procedure.
Civil penalties exist in other regulatory areas. 130 In United
was said to be sufficient to establish probable cause to institute forfeiture proceedings against the
vehicle. United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
128. An analogous situation exists when an owner knows, or has reason to know, his vehicle
might be used by one involved in drug trafficking, but takes no steps to avoid having his vehicle used
in that unlawful manner. See United States v. One 1976 Buick Skylark, 453 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.C.
Colo. 1978).
129. For a discussion of civil penalties, see infra notes 130-41 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397-406 (1938) (acquittal on a charge of
wilful attempt to evade taxes does not bar assessment and collection of a 50% civil penalty). See also
I.R.C. § 6653 (West Supp. 1982) (50 % civil penalty for underpayment of tax due).
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States v. Ward 3 1 the United States Supreme Court held constitutional a provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act 132 that provided for the imposition of a civil penalty against any
owner or operator of an offshore facility from which oil was
discharged in violation of the Act. 133 The respondent in Ward
challenged the constitutionality of the civil penalty because the Act
required "[a]ny person in charge of . . . an offshore facility" to
report violations of the Act. 134 The Court held that the penalty was
fifth
civil' 35 and therefore could not infringe upon the petitioner's
37
amendment 136 guarantee against self-incrimination. 1
The Court broadly defined a civil penalty. 1 38 It noted that the
court of appeals applied the following standards in determining that
the penalty was criminal:
"[W]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability
or restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a
punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, whether its operation will promote the
retribution and
traditional aims of punishment deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which
it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned ....
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
finding that the penalty in Ward was civil, even though the behavior
131. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
132. See33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b) (6) (1976) (amended 1977). At the time of the violation, § 1321 (b)
(6) provided as follows:
Any owner or operator of any vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from
which oil or a hazardous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) of this
subsection shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in which
the Coast Guard is operating of not more than $5,000 for each offense. No penalty
shall be assessed unless the owner or operator charged shall have been given notice and
opportunity for a hearing on such charge. Each violation is a separate offense.
Id.
133. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 244 (1980).
134. Id. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b) (5) (1976) (amended 1978). At the time ofthe violation § 1321
(b) (5) imposed a duty upon "[a]ny person in charge of a vessel or of an onshore facility or an
offshore facility" to report any discharge ofoil or a hazardous substance. Id.
135. 448 U.S. at 251-54.
136. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person... shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be
.
a witness against himself ..
137. 448 U.S. at 251-54.
138. Id. at 249-51.
139. Id. at 247 n.7 (quoting the standards set forth in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 168-69 (1963)).
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to which it applied also constituted criminal conduct. 140 This
finding arguably provides support for the imposition of a civil
penalty against drinking drivers. The Court declared that
"Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in
respect to the same act or omission."141 Therefore, if states were to
proceed civilly against the drinking driver by imposing a civil
penalty, they have the Court's broad language to support a civil
approach.
States could also consider adopting the civil procedure of
bonding. 14 2 The posting of a performance bond could be a
prerequisite to using the state's highways. For those drivers who
choose not to post a cash bond, a state could provide that the
operated vehicle substitutes as a property bond. The cash or
property bond might contain the condition that the owner
guarantees that neither he nor a person to whom he either expressly
or impliedly entrusts his vehicle would use the state's highways
when his consumption of alcohol impairs his ability to drive. The
bonding requirement could be less restrictive and require forfeiture
of the bond by the person who actually drove the vehicle, imposing
no liability upon the owner unless he was the drinking driver.
All the discussed civil approaches provide procedures free
from the criminal system's restrictions and free from its stigma.
The drafting of enabling legislation would present a challenge, but
a state's police power would support these civil approaches.
IV. CONCLUSION
A discussion of civil liability requires consideration of the
individual who is alleged to have breached his responsibility as a
driver of a vehicle. Whether the owner has breached some
responsibility or duty connected with vehicle ownership should also
be considered. Often, the owner is also the operator, thus the civil
responsibilities of ownership and operation merge. When the
operator is not the owner, however, the responsibility of the owner
to insure that the vehicle is operated properly is less clear.
In a number of areas that responsibility is rather well defined,
and the legal system does not hesitate to hold the owner of a vehicle
140. See Ward, 448 U.S. at 249-50.
141. Id. at 250 (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938)).
142. One court, however, recently interpreted a bond forfeiture to be a conviction within the
meaning of its habitual offender act. See Commonwealth v. Brumfield, __ Va .
..
295
S.E.2d 878, 879 (1982).
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responsible for the irresponsible acts of an operator. An
examination of those areas, however, reveals that the owner's
responsibility generally is breached only when an operator's acts
result in injury or other damages to a third person. It seems
reasonable to suggest that the responsibility of ownership is broader
and that it includes a duty to insure that the vehicle is not operated
by one whose presence on the highway presents a foreseeable threat
to the safety of the traveling public. That duty is breached at the
moment the owner gives a dangerous driver access to his vehicle. It
is at that point that the threat is real.
If the privilege of vehicle ownership carries with it the
obligation to control the use of the vehicle, remedial action that
would withdraw that privilege is appropriate. Civil remedies that
place upon the vehicle owner the burden of establishing that he can
be trusted to be a responsible owner also seem appropriate.
When society considers the young driver, it focuses on possibly
the largest group of drivers who operate vehicles belonging to
others. In addition, most of these young drivers are members of the
vehicle owner's household. The owner's status as parent-guardian
places him in a unique position of dual control. There is both the
general control of the parent-guardian over a youth's activities and
the control implied by vehicle ownership.
The great majority of parent-guardians exercise their dual
control in a responsible manner. It is, however, unfortunate that
many do not. Young drivers that suffer from alcohol abuse present
a real danger to society and themselves when they drive. To
accomplish the objective of keeping them off the road, society can
look to the parent-guardian's responsibility to control the use of his
vehicle. If the parent-guardian fails to exercise that control, it
seems only reasonable to suggest that he cannot be trusted to retain
the privileges of vehicle ownership.
Also, many people continue to provide problem drinkers and
chronic alcoholics with access to vehicles. That it is irresponsible for
an owner of a vehicle to entrust his vehicle to one he knows, or has
reason to believe, will drive after drinking is too obvious to be
debated. Here, too, it is suggested that the act is so irresponsible
that it raises a serious question about whether the privilege of
vehicle ownership ought to be continued.
The proposal, then, is for civil remedies that encourage vehicle
owners to assist in reducing highway accidents. The analogies
discussed earlier suggest the civil law will tolerate a rather broad
range of options. An in-depth study will no doubt reveal others, as
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well as point out the strengths and the weaknesses of the brief
analysis within this Article. Current law, however, would support
the civil approach of confiscation and forfeiture, the imposition of a
civil penalty, or the requirement of a bond.

